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Plaintiff-Respondent
-V-

ANGELO FERNANDO QUEVEDO,

Case No. 19049

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, ANGELO FERNANDO QUEVEDO, was
charged by Information with the crimes of Aggravated
Robbery in Count I and Count II, First Degree Felonys
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended).
Trial was held in the Third Judicial District Court on
February 16 and 17, 1983, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, ANGELO FERNANDO QUEVEDO, was tried
and convicted in a jury trial of two Counts of Aggravated
0

obtary, A First Degree Felony in ?iolatian of Utah Code

Ann.

as amended', and was sentenced to

incarceration at the Jtah State Prison for the undeterminate
provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reveral ·Jf
judgement rendered below, anl

_r i

t

be

r:

•r"t.

upon a finding of insu!'c'icienc:; ·Jf the

'·

the alternative, appellant seeks to have ohe

:11
remaniel

for a new trial upon a finding of error on
Point.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 5, 1983, at 9:00 in the evening,
two masked men entered the Triangle Oil Company outlet
at 2700 South 700 East in Salt Lake City, and with the
aid of a pistol robbed the atteniant ef cash and his watch.
(T.

14)

Some eighteen minutes later, the same two masked
men robbed the attendant of a Chem Oil store located at

502 East 2100 South in Salt Lake City.
was used again.

(T. 25)

The same weapon

On the basis of a citizen's report

a blue Chevrolet was observed with three individuals in
the same area.

(T. 41, 59)

This vehicle attempted to

elude the police, resulting in the suspect blue Chevrolet
coming to a sudden stop and three individuals sprinting
away.

(T.

64)

The two who exited the passenger siJe •,iere

apprehended and were

an·j sent:Pn'P·J

t',ec

robberies.
Joseph Vigil and Leonarrj "li5il

to name the

who was driving

-2-

1:-1J

i

Th"'

l'h"C:

Qxited

suspect blue Chevrolet on

'l' e entere•j an apartment building located

Jouth 4CO Sast, Jalt Lake City, and talked to

at

several people, one of whom was Linda Vigil in apartment
5A, questioning them as to whether they had seen a Tongan
running through the building.

(T.

234)

Some time later,

the police returned to apartment 5A and again spoke to
Miss Vigil.

She let them in and the following search

revealed the petitioner in bed with Yolanda Vigil in a
back bedroom.

(T.

222)

At the trial the defense put on three witnesses.
Joseph Vigil, one of the convicted robbers in this case
testified that the third person, the driver, was not
the defendant; and further,

that the driver had not run

toward the apartment house where the defendant was found.
(T.

201-205)

Yolanda Pauline Vigil and Lisa Burkhard, who
were in the apartment where the defendant was found
testified that the appellant, Angelo Fernando Quevedo had
been in the apartment for some time in bed with Yolanda
"/igil.

(T.

:?IS,

231)

ARG"JMS!IT

T!-!E E"/IDE?!CE PRESE:•JTED BY THE STATE WAS
INSUFFICISNT TO SSTABLISH THE GUILT OF
C'HE APPSLLA:JT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

-3-

The driver exited t:--:e

;:2 ,.;.-=·

located at 837 South
The police

t.i'.

l

'

-11r

_l_

l.

several people, one of whom was
them as to whether they had seen a Tong'lr: r'1nn' rh·
the building.

(T.

234)

Some time later, tree pol:'..:ce

returned to apartment SA and again spoke

7igil.

She let them in and the following search revealed the
petitioners in bed with Yolanda Vigil in a back bedroom.
(T.

222)

At the trial the defense put on three witnesses.
Joseph Vigil, one of the convicted robbers in this case,
testified that the third person, the driver, was not the
defendant; and further,

that the driver had not run toward

the apartment house where the defendant was found.
(T.

201-205)

Yolanda Pauline Vigil and Lisa Burkhard, who
were in the apartment where the defendant was found testified
that the appellant, Angelo

Quevedo

been in the apartment for some time in bed with Yolanda
Vigil.

(T.

218, 231)
ARGUMENT
?IJI:TT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTE'.:: BY
INSUFFICIEiJT TIJ 2:3TABLCH
THE APPELLA:JT BE"Ic:rc: A "\SA

well

that a reviewing court has
3.

cas"=' on sufficiency of the

for review was clearly stated in
'"

·1 .

·ti i ls on,

5 6 5 P . 2d 6 6 ( 19 7 7 ) :

In order for the defendant to successfully challenge and overturn a verdict on
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence,
it must appear that upon so viewing the evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily
entertain a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime. 565 P. 2d 68.
See Also State v. Fort, 572 P. 2d 1387.
In State v. Mills, 530 P. 2d 1272 (1975), this
court also addressed when sufficiency of the evidence
must be challenged:
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain his conviction, it must appear
that viewing the evidence and all interferences
that may reasonably be drawn therefrom,
in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury, reasonable minds could not
believe him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
530 P. 2d at 1272.
This Court in the recent past has recognized
the duty of a reviewing court to review a case on the
sufficiency of the evidence where the issue is properly
presented.
659 P.

Most recently this Court in State v. Petree,

2d 443 (Utah 1983) stated:
Considering that question
[W]e
review the evijence and all inferences
which
rc;etsonabl.'f be drawn from it
in the
most 2 avorable to the verdict
(Jf t:hc
/Je
the jury conviction
for
evidence only when the
evidence so viewed is sufficiently incon2lusive or inherently impallatable
1

that reasonable minds must
a reasonable doubt that the
committed the
f,Jr
convicted.
659 P. 2d at 4:14.
See also, State v. Linden, 6S7 P.
State v. Mccardle, 652 P.
Howell, 649 P.

2cJ 1367

(;;ta!1

·

,

2d 942 (Utah 1982); 3tate

2d 91 (Utah 1982); 3tate v. Y.erekes,

622 P. 2d 1161 (Utah 1980).
In this case, appellant contends that there was
sufficient evidence of him being elsewhere and thus a
reasonable doubt is raised.

In State v. Meacham,

455

P. 2d 156 (1969) the Court specifically addresses this:
... it is nevertheless the burden of the
State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt; and if the evidence of
the defendant's being elsewhere is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to
his being involved in the crime, he should
be aquitted.
455 P. 2d at 158.
See also State v. Wilson, 565 P.

2d (1977) 66 at 68

which again addresses this issue:
The burden is upon the State to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and if
the evidence with respect to any defense,
e.g., in this instance alibi, is sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, he should be acquitted.
Appellant contends that the evidence introduced by
the State at trial is

in light 0f tta jafense

testimony which established that the defendant had
his girlfriend prior to his arrest and not with the
robbers.

(T.

201, 218, 231)

re
-_,-

From the

i+,
1

'"-nt

i:c important to point out that this
>:ise, !':elJ that it is sufficient for
evidence or lack thereof creates a

as to any element of the crime.
v. Torres, 61? P.

(State

2d 695). Here, it is respectfully

submitted by the appellant, through his defense testimony
that he has met the standard of reasonable doubt.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION ON IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY.
At trial defense counsel proferred the following
Instruction to the Court.

That Instruction provided in

part:
In appraising the identification
testimony of a witness, you should
consider the following:
(1)
Are you convinced that the
witness had the capacity and an
adequate opportunity to observe
the of fender?
Whether the witness had an adequate
to observe the person at
the time will be affected by such
matters as how long or short a time
was available to observe the offender,
how
or :lase the witness was from
the
how good
lighting

·"1hetf-:PY' ':ht> .vitness had had
1

the person in

. _ h>? ;:ao t.

-t:-

(2)
Are you satisfied that tre
identification made by ':hat
subsequent to the event was a
of her own
m3y
take into account bnth the stren;;"!1
of the identifi,;ation, and the
circumstances under which the ijen':ification was made.
If the identification by the
may have been influenced by tr.e '2 irc1imstances under which the defendant was
presented to her for identification,
you should scrutinize the identification
with great care.
You may also consider
the length of time that lapsed between
the occurrence of the crime and the
next opportunity of the witness to
see or hear the defendant, as a
factor bearing on the reliability of
the identification.

(3) Finally, you must consider
the credibility of each identification
witness in the same way as any other
witness; consider whether she is truthful, and consider whether she had the
capacity and opportunity to make a
reliable observation on the matter
covered in her testimony.
The burden of proof on the State
extends to every element of the offense
and the identity of the perpetrator
is such an element.
The State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Angelo Fernando Quevedo was the perpetrator
of the offense.
If after examining
the testimony you have a reasonable
doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the defendant
not guilty.

The trial court refused to give the instruction as
and exception was taken.

(T.

The dangers inherent in ey w:tness ijc,,,':':':
0

evidence have been the subject of

. r

In an oft-quoted passage, the late Folix Frankfurtor,

-1-

i

>fr,

l

L

l

:- '

''' "' (, ) :
·"=r.

:1_:._ l./

id en t if i ,cat ion
3+-r2ngers is

ru3 . . >10rt::hy.

"rhe

3.re established by a fJrmijable number of
instances
in the resords of English
and American trials.
These instances
are recent -- not due to the brutalities
of ancient sriminal procedure ...
Evidence as to identity based on
personal impressions, however bona fide,
is perhaps of all classes of evidence
the lease to be relied upon, and
therefore, unless supported by other
facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict
of a jury.
Frankfurter,
Trial of
Sacco and Vanzetti.
The unreliability of eyewitness identification
has been well documented in the literature and law review
articles have been written on the subject in recent years.

1

The commentators note that reasons for this unreliability
are found in the problems that are associated with human
perception and memory, both of which play a vital role in
eyewitness identification.

A lengthy discussion of these

problems are found in a law review article dealing with

1.
Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification,
29 Stan. L. Rev. 3b9 11917);
Process Standards for the
Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan.
L. Eev. 4t·l \
Ideni:-i:'ication Evidence: - :;,-:-',
.:i'=-'r
W.'.:)';' 71')80); Ellis,
[.J_'Jies, 3her:Y1>=';'1,
-?S
Identification,
:lat. T. 'ri"1.
·:"
'i :-oice Identification
in
'"''
' 1 ,, .•.'"'
:J
::'1e Federal Rules of
4J
=-.·1w
s.1:
73.
-

.

the problems of perception and mgmor;
?

with hearsa; testimon;.-

·

the author noted:

At a basic level
by objective structural f:i·ctClr::;
as the nature of the stimulus, thµ impadof the stimulus in the sense
according to various physical laws,
the operation of afferent neural pathwa;s
from the sense organs to the brain, and
the cortical projection or reconstructi::;n
of the stimulus.
However, the neurological
system operates to transduce physical energy
into a sensation, it is clear that interpretation is required to transform sensation
into meaning.
(Emphasis Added)

*

*

*

In organizing raw sensory input, the
central nervous system is not a photograph
recorder.
. Injury, pathology, drugs,
youth and senility can seriously impair
the accuracy of these processes.
1970
Utah Law. Rev. at 9.
In United States v. Barber, 412 F.

2d 517 (3rd

Cir. 1971), the court gave a similar description of :he
processes involved in human observation, perception and
memory.

It then went on to state, with respect to eye-

witness identification:
Eyewitness identification testimony, therefore,
is an expression of a belief or impression by
the witness.
If there is a high degree of
precision and certainty in his expressicn,

2.
Stewart, Perception,
and "earsa·1; T 1 : ·
of Present Law and the ?reposed Fejera: ?u 1 es
1970 Utah Law Rev. 1.

-j-

r :_ t

; , ·

which is :onsistent with any prior statements
anj
on cross-examination, the
s:atpm 0 nt Jf
witness may be regarded
as '
o: fact.
If certainty is
expression is deemed to possess
an
quality of inferior rank.
where the circumstances surrounding
the criminal act gave limited opportunity
for observation or utilization of the
sensory perception, or where uncertainty
is expressed by the witness himself, or
exposed by a past history of the witness'
statements or demonstrated by cross-examination,
the statement of identity should be considered
as only an expression of opinion and should
be accompanied by appropriate instructions
as to its sufficiency and weight.
To be
sure, the courts have been generous in
the admission of eyewitness identification
in order to permit the jury to make its
own assessment.
The emphasis has been on
inclusion of evidence, rather than exclusion;
on credibility, rather than admissibility.
[footnotes omitted] (Emphasis added)
412 F.
2d at 527.
In the instant case, the identification evidence
is based upon the unreliable representations of officers due
to the heat of the chase, and in less than ideal lighting.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Warren,
635 P.

2d 1263 (Kan. 1981), discussed the problems which

are associated with the use of identification evidence.
The court then took note of the particular problems that
arise in the courtroom with that evidence.
In spite of the great volume of articles
on the subject of eyewitness testimony
by legal writers and the great deal of
by rsychologists in
this country
[-:.:1'!'?
.cl
:3-k>? t'.le problem
'1ntil
have not
takan affective steps to confront it.
The trouble is that many judges have
assumed that an ''eyeball" witness, who

identifies the accused as
is the most reli3ble of
••
if there are ar.y quest i n.; ".·
·> ·
identification, t:hr=> j11r Jr.:J,
>-;;,":r· ':Ji
,
are fully capable·)'.'
·r,··
credibility of the witness
..
instructions from the 2•iurt.
·1et .;
of mistaken identification arg not
infrequent and the problem of misi·Jentification has not been alleviated.
1

,

The Kansas procedure does provide certain
safeguards to prevent the conviction of
an innocent accused on the basis of
unreliable eyewitness identification.
Our trial courts have the power to
suppress eyewitness testimony, if the
eyewitness identification procedure
rendered the testimony unreliable.
Cross-examination and argument by defense
counsel afford some protection.
Unfortunately, these procedures have not
solved the problem.
Able defense
counsel have attempted to combat unreliable
eyewitness identification by two additional
methods:
They have called to the witness
stand expert witnesses in the field of
psychology to testify as to the various
factors which may cause eyewitness
identification to be unreliable.
They
have also requested the trial court to
give a cautionary instruction stating
the factors to be considered by the jury
in weighing the credibility of eyewitness
testimony.
635 P. 2d at 1241.
In Warren, the trial court refused to allow the defense to
take either of these actions.

The defendant's expert on

eyewitness identification, was not allowed to testify
and the court refused to give the same instruction as
appellant requested in the instant case.

Aft er a le ngt

discussion on the use of expert testimony • ;. sol"Je !:lie
problems associated with the eyewitness
Kansas Court stated:

-11-

3',;.b

r_,,_. 1.i·:·1":"

l: .. :·tJ;;;;r

·11e r.a·re
evidence

':h>-? problem.
•t1e
pr0t::"='m can be allevi-

orcp 0 r
instruction
which sets forth the factors
to be
in evaluating eyewitness
3·1ch an instruction, coupled
·,.;i ':t: ·1is'Jr0u.s
and
persua3ive argument by defense counsel
dealing realistically with the shortand trouble spots of the identification process, should protect the rights
of the defendant and at the same time enable
the courts to avoid the problems involved in
the admission of expert testimony on this
iJ:?C: P. 2d 1243.
tv

The instruction that the Kansas Court held should
ce gi·1en was ':hat framed by the United States Court of
Appeal for the District of Columbia in United States v.
Telfaire,

469 F.

2d 552 (D.C. Cir., 1972).

3

The Telfaire

court described the need for such an instruction stating:
The presumption of innocence that
safeguards the common law system must
be a premise that is realized in
instruction and not merely a promise.
In pursuance of that objective, we
have pointed out the importance of
and need fer special instruction on
the key issue
identification, which
emphasi=es
the jury the need for
finding that the circumstances of the
identification are convincing beyond
a reasonable doubt.
This need was
voiced !n 1142 in McKenzie v. Cnited
3tatr?:::, '" 1
:;-i
__,,..
.1-r,j it r.as

··e

wcs
with approval by Justice
rinian in State v. Malmrose, 649
and as requested by appellant in

been given vitality in our opi ions Jf
recent years -- following the
Court's 1966 Wade-Gilbert v.
alif

38 8 u . s . 2 6 3 '

j

7 s.

t .

1

l' l

.

,j .

2d 1178 (1967)
Stovall ·1. [enn0, :c.J
U.S. 293 trilogy focusing on
very
real danger of mistaken
as a threat to justice.
We refer
our post-Wade opinions in Gregory v.
United States, 369 F. 2d 185 (10661 and
Macklin v. United States, 409 F. 2d 174
(1969). These opinions sought to take
into account the traditional recognition
that identification testimony presents
special problems of reliability by
stressing the importance of an identification instruction even in cases meeting
the constitutional threshold of admissibility.
[footnotes omitted] 469 F. 2d at 555.
The appeals court then went on to hold the
following:
... we have considered the fact that trial
courts are often required to determine the
admissibility of eyewitness testimony where
issues of unreliability are raised.
As
pointed out by Chief Justice Schroeder in
State v. Ponds, 227 Kan. 627, 608 P. 2d
946, in testing the reliability of
identification testimony, the five
factors mentioned in Neil v. Biggers
[490 U.S. 188 (1972)] should be considered
by the trial court.
If these five factors
should be considered in determining the
admissibility of the testimony, it would
seem even more appropriate to require the
jury to consider the same factors in weighing
the credibility of the eyewitness identification testimony.
Otherwise the jury might
reasonably conclude that the admission of
the evidence the trial court vouched for
its reliability.
We think it clear that,
in order to prevent potential injustice,
some standards must be provided the
so that the credibility of eyewitness
identification testimony can be intel!igant:;
and fairly weighed.
giving of such an
instruction will take only a couple of
minutes in trial time and will be WP!l

-13-

.!I

future injustices can be
i at 1244
by

+-,

l

'i ','

p

]

•

-· c ·1,;

3tatces

•1.

i_

'J11r:iLcer of other juris-

Telf2iree, s11ora, shoulj be given when ;1arranted
1

by circur:istances of

3-

particular case.

4

This court has addressed this issue several times.
While this court has not held in the past that such an
instruction was required,

has never held that the

giving of such an instruction would be error.
Malmrose, 649 P.

State v.

2j 56 ('Jtah l'.)82); State v. Schaffer,

638 P. 2d 1135 ('Jtah 1921).

In State v. Mccumber, 622

P. 2d 353 (Utah 1980 ), the issue of the refusal to give
an instruction on eyewitness identification was raised;
with respect to that issue this court stated:

A criminal defendant is entitled to

have a jury instructed on his theory
of the case if there is any substantial
evidence to justify such an instruction.
Where, however, the requested instruction
is denied, no prejudicial error occurs if
it appears that the giving of the requested
instruction would not have affected the
outcome of the trial.
Moreover, a defendant
is not entitled to an instruction which is
redundant or repetitive of principles
enunciated in other instructions given

:'_as been either
j'J.Y'isdictions
3-S r"?fl'?''-.+-.=::.,l t·,' r f
Jnited States v. Holly
F.
'.__)•-:,
;
States v. Hodges, 515
F. ::'j -;SD 1 -:'th
cJ
, 3tate -1. Benjamin, 363 A. 2d
"'62 (Conn.
S:at:e ·1.
514 P. 2d 1354 (Or. App.
1
1')'73),
jen.
J.S.
1974).

;>e<:'.Jmmeride l
1

__

)r

-l4-

n .....

to the jury.
The prinsioal
defendant's proposed instrq2t i )n
1·
with the State's
an!
the factors to consider in
the testimony of an °yewitnes3.
He.
of these factors
with in other instructions
to the jury by the trial court.
As
a result, we cannot agree that the denial
of the proposed instruction constituted
reversible error.
[footnote omitted=
6 2 2 P. 2d at 3 5 9.
In the instant case, it is important to note
the general instruction on the presumption of innocence and
burden of proof do not alleviate the prejudice in refusing
to instruct the jury with respect to the inherent dangers
of eyewitness and voice identification.
held that a jury need not ".

This court has

. go through such a tortuous

process when that result could have been achieved by giving
the defendant's requested instruction, or one of that
substance."

State v. Torres, 619 P.

2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980).

The giving of an instruction similar to that
requested by the appellant would achieve in a straight
forward manner the necessary function of informing the jury
upon the dangers inherent in identification testimony.
Further, such an instruction would have fairly stated the
theory of the defense.

It would appear that the giving

of such an instruction would be neither illegal, unconstitutional or unfair, rather policy and fairness dictatP
giving such an instruction.
The circumstances surrounding the iiPntificatiJn
at the time of the arrest and chase made for a highly
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Further, the use of identification
;nrlC?l'

·.:·

:f

give rise to a large amount
EvC?n if this court were not to hold that a

type instruction must be given in all cases, it was
certainly necessary in this case.
In the instant case, and in similar cases where
the instruction is not given, the defense is placed in
the position of mixing elements of argument with sound
principles of law and policy as though the whole were
argument.

Basic fundamentals of the nature of identification

testimony, as with other instructions on the law are to be
applied to the facts in argument.

It is the role of the

judge to separate argument from legal principle, as is
done in cases where alibi or other legal issues are raised.
If the defense attorney is required to place those principles
before the jury as part of argument without an instruction,
the jury cannot, and will not separate the two.
A criminal conviction must be reversed if there
is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would be different
if the requested instruction had been given.
560 P. 2d 1120 (Utah 1977).

State v. Mitcheson,

Appellant respectfully submits

that had the jury had the opportunity to consider the
evidence in light of
wo11lrJ hJ.'Je

bPen

instruction, a different result

)br 'liw•,j.
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CONCLUSION
The conviction of the appellant was
through the testimony of sever2l officers who, at
times, described different individuals as the appellant.
Based upon the prejudicial failure to give appellant's
Instruction and insufficiency of the evidence as discussed
above, appellant respectfully requests the above requested

j/

relief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this_'::..'

day of Ma?{h, 1924.

A.
Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
of March, 1984.
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